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	<title>Root Cause Analysis Instructor Blog &#187; Ely Wilson</title>
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	<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com</link>
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		<title>Prevention vs. Blame in Car Repairs</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/prevention-vs-blame-in-car-repairs/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/prevention-vs-blame-in-car-repairs/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2009 19:10:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[blame]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prevention]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=390</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[My car broke down on the highway the other day and when I finally got the car towed to a mechanic, it was discovered that the engine had failed when the timing belt slipped.  The hydraulic tensioner for the timing belt had worn out and allowed the belt to become loose.  This came as quite [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My car broke down on the highway the other day and when I finally got the car towed to a mechanic, it was discovered that the engine had failed when the timing belt slipped.  The hydraulic tensioner for the timing belt had worn out and allowed the belt to become loose.  This came as quite a surprise, since I had paid a different mechanic to have the timing belt and its tensioner replaced a short time earlier.  The new mechanic showed me the failed parts and it was clear that the tensioner (and several other parts that should have been replaced with the timing belt) had never been replaced.</p>
<p>Of course, it would be easy to focus the blame on the previous mechanic, who at best was grossly negligent and at worst was committing outright fraud.  But what interests me more than fixing the blame is preventing a similar breakdown from happening again.  I certainly won’t use that particular mechanic again, but what prevents the same problem from occurring with a different mechanic?  Even the best mechanic could forget to do part of a job on a particularly bad day.</p>
<p>What I would like is to verify that the work was done, but that is difficult in the case of a timing belt change, since the affected parts are behind a cover and not visible.  Besides, I probably don’t have the experience to tell by sight whether the job was done.  I have a lot more confidence that the second mechanic replaced all of the parts, because he showed me the old parts.  An effective solution for future repairs might be to always ask for the old parts, just so that I can know whether they remembered to perform the entire job.</p>
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		<title>Are your solutions effective at reducing risk?</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/are-your-solutions-effective-at-reducing-risk/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/are-your-solutions-effective-at-reducing-risk/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2009 13:45:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air travel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[consequences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[probability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=370</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I recently heard a story that reminded me of how people often struggle to manage risk and reliability.
A group of about 20 high school students were travelling across the U.S. by air for a school-sponsored activity.  The students had been split between two different flights, with 10 students on each flight.  Since there was only [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I recently heard a story that reminded me of how people often struggle to manage risk and reliability.</p>
<p>A group of about 20 high school students were travelling across the U.S. by air for a school-sponsored activity.  The students had been split between two different flights, with 10 students on each flight.  Since there was only one adult in the group, the 10 youngest students were put on the flight with the adult, because the younger students seemed more at risk if their flight were delayed or diverted.</p>
<p>As it happened, the flight for the older students was cancelled, so those students were left to fend for themselves until the next available flight the next day.</p>
<p>Someone who is concerned with <a title="Cause Analysis Root, Risk and Reliability" href="http://www.root-cause-analysis.org/definition/" target="_blank">risk and reliability</a> will ask, why were the students split into two groups, resulting in half of the students being stranded without an adult?  Did the airline only have enough seats for half of the group on each flight?  It was suggested to me that, as a matter of school policy, large groups were often split in two, so that if one of the planes crashed, then the number of students lost in the tragedy would be reduced.</p>
<p>Would such a policy make sense from a risk management perspective?  The following Cause Map shows the basic root cause analysis for losing all of the students in a plane crash, and how separating the students into two groups prevents (that is, reduces the risk of) losing all of the students.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter" title="Cause Map Part 1" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/blog-crashesvscancels-cm1.gif" alt="" width="271" height="258" />However, splitting the students into two groups greatly increases the possibility of some students being stranded without an adult, as shown in the Cause Map below.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter" title="Cause Map Part 2" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/blog-crashesvscancels-cm2.gif" alt="" width="406" height="310" />The missing piece of this risk management puzzle is the probabilities that the causes in the <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/FAQ.aspx" target="_blank">Cause Maps</a> occur.  Risk can be quantified by multiplying the consequence of a failure times its probability.  Over the past year, 1.63% of U.S. plane flights have been cancelled, so if the students are split into two groups, the unescorted group will become stranded at least 1 time in 100.  On the other hand, the probability that a plane flight will crash is on the order of 1 in 10,000,000 and, contrary to what you may think, it is rare that more than a quarter of the passengers die in a crash.</p>
<p>Creating a policy to split up the students is a possible solution to the problem of losing all students in a single crash, but now that the risks are better understood, is it a very effective solution for reducing the overall risk to the students?</p>
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		<title>Why Are Some Hospitals Better Than Others?</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/why-are-some-hospitals-better-than-others/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/why-are-some-hospitals-better-than-others/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2009 13:33:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hospital]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[root cause analysis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=352</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A USA Today article published earlier this month (‘Double failure&#8217; at USA&#8217;s hospitals, dated July 9, 2009) discussed a Medicare analysis of U.S. hospitals which found that some hospitals have higher death rates and higher patient readmission rates than other hospitals.  &#8220;At 5.9% of hospitals, patients with pneumonia died at rates significantly higher than the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A <a title="USA Today Article" href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-07-09-hospital-deaths_N.htm" target="_blank">USA Today article</a> published earlier this month (‘Double failure&#8217; at USA&#8217;s hospitals, dated July 9, 2009) discussed a Medicare analysis of U.S. hospitals which found that some hospitals have higher death rates and higher patient readmission rates than other hospitals.  &#8220;At 5.9% of hospitals, patients with pneumonia died at rates significantly higher than the national average.  With heart failure, 3.4% of hospitals had death rates higher than the average, and 1.2% of hospitals were higher when it came to heart attack.&#8221;</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t understand how only 1.2% of hospitals can have a death rate higher than the national average (shouldn&#8217;t 50% be higher than the average?), but what was most interesting to me was that the article mainly focused on how hospitals in richer, more populated areas tend to have slightly lower death and readmission rates.  I&#8217;m sure that the death rate is, in part, determined by causes related to household income, such as the types of food people eat and how much they exercise.  However, a hospital can&#8217;t necessarily control how high the quality of life is in its neighborhood.  A <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis-CM-Basics.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> of why one hospital&#8217;s death rates are higher than another&#8217;s should probably focus more on the things that the hospital can control, that is, the hospital&#8217;s internal processes.</p>
<p>Want to learn more about healthcare root cause analysis?  See our <a title="Patient Safety Blog" href="http://www.patient-safety-blog.com/" target="_blank">patient safety blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>Investigation of Air France Flight 447</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/investigation-of-air-france-flight-447/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/investigation-of-air-france-flight-447/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 15:55:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cause-and-effect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[evidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[possible causes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[root cause analysis]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=312</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The investigation into the causes of the crash of Air France Flight 447 is still in its earliest phases. This investigation is especially complicated because almost all of the evidence is spread across (and under) one of the more inaccessible areas of the Atlantic Ocean. Despite this lack of evidence, people have begun to work [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The investigation into the causes of the crash of Air France Flight 447 is still in its earliest phases. This investigation is especially complicated because almost all of the evidence is spread across (and under) one of the more inaccessible areas of the Atlantic Ocean. Despite this lack of evidence, people have begun to work out their hypotheses for the possible causes of the crash. Possible causes have included catastrophic damage due to high winds, sudden failure of the electronics, or an in-flight explosion. The task in this phase of a <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> is to search out the evidence that either supports or disproves the possible causes.</p>
<p>Sometimes there is disagreement about whether the evidence actually supports a particular possible cause. Recent reports from the Flight 447 investigation state that two of the passengers may be linked to terrorist groups. This evidence seems to support the possibility of an in-flight explosion due to terrorism. On the other hand, some have noted that there was a lot of oil found on the surface of the ocean in the vicinity of the crash.   This would suggest an in-flight explosion could not have happened because the oil would have burned up while in the air. This is the point in many <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Consulting.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis investigations </a>where heated arguments begin, and the leader of the investigation might be tempted to just give up.</p>
<p><img class="aligncenter" title="Cause Map - 2 Boxes" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/AirFrance-cm2.gif" alt="" width="256" height="91" /></p>
<p>The key to resolving the argument and making some progress in the investigation might be getting into more detail in the chain of cause-and-effect. In this example, the argument is whether the cause &#8220;In-flight explosion&#8221; produces the effect &#8220;No oil on water.&#8221; If this cause-and-effect relationship is accurate, then we should be able to add more causes in between to explain step-by-step how an in-flight explosion results in no oil on the water. Laying out the causes and effects in detail will allow focusing the discussion on what specific cause-and-effect is in doubt and what specific piece of evidence is needed to resolve the disagreement.<img class="aligncenter" title="Cause Map - 6 Boxes" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/AirFrance-cm6.gif" alt="" width="556" height="253" /></p>
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		<title>Root Cause Analysis: When the Incident Report Assigns a Category</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/root-cause-analysis-when-the-incident-report-assigns-a-category/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/root-cause-analysis-when-the-incident-report-assigns-a-category/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2009 20:27:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[categorization]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=198</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Many organizations have requirements for reporting incidents that include categorizing the general cause of the incident.  Common categories for incidents include personnel error, procedure error, or equipment failure.  This method of reporting incidents leads to the question of how the categories relate to the  of the incident.
The reason for assigning incidents and problems to predefined [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many organizations have requirements for reporting incidents that include categorizing the general cause of the incident.  Common categories for incidents include personnel error, procedure error, or equipment failure.  This method of reporting incidents leads to the question of how the categories relate to the  of the incident.</p>
<p>The reason for assigning incidents and problems to predefined categories is to collect data on the types of problems that have occurred and establish trends in the numbers of problems occurring in each category.  These trends could highlight systemic issues with the organization&#8217;s investigation program or with the organization as a whole.  However, determining which category should be used for a particular problem is not a <a title="Root Cause Analyisis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a>.</p>
<p>The purpose of a <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Basics" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis-CM-Basics.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> is to determine the best solutions to prevent problems from occurring.  Finding the best solutions requires identifying all of the causes of the issue and getting specific enough about the causes to be able to develop specific, effective solutions.  A <a title="ThinkReliability :: Root Cause Analysis :: Training" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis-public-workshops.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> cannot stop at causes such as &#8220;personnel error,&#8221; but must (1) delve into the underlying causes behind the personnel error and (2) ask what else had to happen, besides the personnel error, for the incident to occur.</p>
<p>Once a thorough <a title="ThinkReliability :: Root Cause Analysis :: Training" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> is completed, then the most appropriate category (or categories) for the incident can be determined based on a complete understanding of all of the causes of the issue.</p>
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		<title>Some of the most powerful tools are fundamentally simple</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/some-of-the-most-powerful-tools-are-fundamentally-simple/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/some-of-the-most-powerful-tools-are-fundamentally-simple/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 00:08:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncomplicated]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=169</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[When you need to do a mathematical calculation, do you reach for an abacus and slide rule, or a hand-held calculator?  I don&#8217;t see many people get out an abacus or slide rule anymore, even though both tools can do some pretty complex calculations.  Modern calculators are much easier to use, because they&#8217;re simpler.  It [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When you need to do a mathematical calculation, do you reach for an abacus and slide rule, or a hand-held calculator?  I don&#8217;t see many people get out an abacus or slide rule anymore, even though both tools can do some pretty complex calculations.  Modern calculators are much easier to use, because they&#8217;re simpler.  It doesn&#8217;t take much effort to remember which buttons to press in order to divide 148 by 3, because each button has a clear and simple function.  A calculator also reliably produces the correct result, because the computer at a calculator&#8217;s heart manipulates the numbers in their fundamental form (that is, in binary).  Just because a calculator is simple to use and represents numbers in a simple, fundamental way, doesn&#8217;t mean that a calculator lacks to power to do complex calculations.</p>
<p>Similarly, there are many different tools for performing a <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a>.  At a fundamental level, a <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis.aspx" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> is uncovering &#8220;why&#8221; something happened by breaking down the issue into its causes and effects.  I like the Cause Mapping method for root cause analysis because it shows how the causes and effects of an issue are connected, without adding confusing terminology or complicated rules.  But just because a Cause Map is clear and uncomplicated doesn&#8217;t mean that it lacks the power to unravel the most complex incidents.</p>
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		<title>What is the difference between a Cause Map and a Fault Tree?</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/what-is-the-difference-between-a-cause-map-and-a-fault-tree/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/what-is-the-difference-between-a-cause-map-and-a-fault-tree/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 19:23:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=138</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
I was recently asked this question following one of my Cause Mapping workshops: what is the difference between a Cause Map and a fault tree?  I can understand why this question would be raised, since Cause Mapping and fault tree analysis are both techniques for performing a root cause analysis.  At a fundamental level, all [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="mceTemp mceIEcenter">
<div class="mceTemp mceIEcenter" style="text-align: justify;">I was recently asked this question following one of my Cause Mapping workshops: what is the difference between a Cause Map and a fault tree?  I can understand why this question would be raised, since Cause Mapping and fault tree analysis are both techniques for performing a <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a>.  At a fundamental level, all <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a> methods use the same cause-and-effect principle to understand why an incident occurs.  The main difference between a Cause Map and a fault tree lies in the focus of the analysis.</div>
<div class="mceTemp mceIEcenter" style="text-align: justify;">A Fault Tree Analysis (also known as a &#8220;Probabilistic Risk Assessment&#8221;) is focused on the many ways that a failure COULD occur and on the probabilities of each of those failure &#8220;branches&#8221; occurring.  A thorough fault tree analysis is primarily a mathematical model for calculating the probability that each failure branch could occur.  This analysis is done in the hope of gaining insight into which areas of the overall system should be improved to increase reliability.  The main emphasis is generally on modeling the probability of each branch accurately and a software tool is often needed to construct the mathematical model.</div>
<div class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 588px">
	<img title="Fault Tree" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/Fault tree 4.gif" alt="Common Format of a Fault Tree" width="588" height="309" />
	<p class="wp-caption-text">Common Format of a Fault Tree</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="mceTemp">
<div class="mceTemp mceIEcenter"><a href="http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/fault-tree-21.gif"></a></div>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cause Maps can also be used to analyze failures that COULD occur, but the focus is generally on building a common understanding of the system and showing the failure modes in a clear manner.  I encourage putting colors, diagrams, and evidence on the Cause Map to show how the failure occurs.  Of course, if the data is available to assign probabilities to the causes, then this information can also be shown on the Cause Map.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Cause Maps are used extensively for problems that DID occur in the past, because supporting the causes with evidence is crucial to an effective <a title="Root Cause Analysis :: ThinkReliability :: Cause Mapping" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com" target="_blank">root cause analysis</a>.  Fault trees are generally not useful for understanding the cause-and-effect of problems that DID occur, since all of the probabilities are 100% that the causes DID occur.  Another important aspect of the Cause Mapping method is that it includes all three steps of effective problem solving: defining the problem, causal analysis, and identifying the best solutions.</p>
<div class="mceTemp mceIEcenter">
<p><img title="Failed Motor Cause Map" src="http://www.thinkreliability.com/InstructorBlogs/failed motor cause map.gif" alt="Cause Map for a Failed Motor" width="582" height="435" /></p>
<dl class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 592px; height: 30px;">
<dt class="wp-caption-dt"> </dt>
<dd class="wp-caption-dd">Cause Map for a Failed Motor</dd>
</dl>
</div>
</div>
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		<title>Why Are Some Organizations Better at Maintaining High Reliability?</title>
		<link>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/why-are-some-organizations-better-at-maintaining-high-reliability/</link>
		<comments>http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/why-are-some-organizations-better-at-maintaining-high-reliability/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2009 19:47:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ely</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ely Wilson]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rootcauseanalysisblog.com/?p=121</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The book &#8220;Managing the Unexpected&#8221; by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe provides some rare insight into why some organizations seem to have fewer than their share of problems, despite functioning in very challenging environments.  Nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers are offered as examples of organizations that perform complex operations day after day, but don&#8217;t [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The book &#8220;Managing the Unexpected&#8221; by Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe provides some rare insight into why some organizations seem to have fewer than their share of problems, despite functioning in very challenging environments.  Nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers are offered as examples of organizations that perform complex operations day after day, but don&#8217;t seem to suffer many accidents.  Weick and Sutcliffe observed that this feat is largely accomplished by nurturing a culture of &#8220;mindfulness.&#8221;  Mindfulness includes the following elements: preoccupation with failures rather than successes, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.  Sounds simple, right?  It might not surprise you that there is no quick fix to instill more mindfulness in your organization.  But Weick and Sutcliffe found that nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers do have a common method for creating the culture of mindfulness: <a title="Root Cause Analysis" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis.aspx" target="_self">root cause analysis</a>.  These &#8220;high reliability organizations&#8221; perform detailed root cause analyses, or critiques, of anything that doesn&#8217;t go well, no matter how inconsequential the issue might seem.  These incident investigations have the clearly-communicated goal of improving the organizations&#8217; processes, not blaming those involved.  The benefit?  A frequent reminder that finding and reporting problems is rewarded, that work process is important, and that everyone has a role in improving reliability.  Any organization can strengthen its culture and achieve high performance with <a title="Root Cause Analysis" href="http://www.thinkreliability.com/Root-Cause-Analysis.aspx" target="_self">root cause analysis</a>, one problem at a time.</p>
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